16-30 December 1944
424th Infantry Regiment
106th Infantry Division

Declassified 3/8/82

Interview with Col. A.D. Reid, regimental commander, 424th Infantry Regiment, vicinity Trois Ponts, Belgium, 10 January 1945. Interviewed by Captain K. W. Hechler, 2d Info & History Service (VIII Corps)

Note: Straight lines " __ __ __ _ " denote unrecognizable text in the original reports.

 In attempting to secure the background of the committal of the 1st Battalion, 424th Infantry, in the vicinity of Winterspelt on the first morning of the counterattack, I ask Colonel Reid whether there was any difficulty in securing its release from division control as division reserve. Colonel Reid looked at me silently for a few minutes, and then stated: “ I should lead with my chin? Tell me what you want to know about it.” I said that I gathered that the fortuitous presence of General Perrin, assistant division commander, on the morning of 16 December at the CP enabled C Company of the 1st battalion to be committed without clearance by General Jones, and also hastened the commitment of the remainder of the 1st Battalion which might have been delayed if General Perrin had not been in the area. Colonel Reid looked at me again for a few moments and replied: ”Let it stand at that." I should draw the conclusion from this and other remarks from his conversation that he felt that there was considerable delay before the 1st Bn was actually thrown in.

 When the attack first hit, one platoon of G Company was placed into a gap between the south flank of the 424th and the north flank of the 112th infantry, “but after the Cannon Company was hit and the enemy started to converge on Winterspelt, I had to recall this platoon and thus rob both Peter and Paul to pay Winterspelt.”

 Colonel Reid mentioned that his biggest difficulty in controlling the regiment was their lack of sufficient knowledge on the larger picture and how it effected the regimental front. “In such a situation,” he said, “there is always the chance of whether you should try to hold _ _ _ _(despite the fact that there were insufficient troops to do so), or whether you should balance on the balls of your feet and withdraw strategically to fight a better battle another day. There never seemed to be adequate information available on such things as strength, the breadth and depth of the enemy penetration on the sectors outside of the regiment; the availability of reinforcements and when they might arrive; and what was developing in the plans of higher headquarters. So much was unconfirmed rumors. It was difficult to keep up with the situation regarding the 9th and the 7th Armored, and we heard rumors that the 10th Armored might spearhead up from the south, or even that the 11th Armored might come east from the Meuse. In order to make sound decisions on whether to hold tenaciously or withdraw to better positions, information available to a regimental commander must be more concrete and adequate.”

 The breadth on the enemy attack makes it impossible to reduce it to a single spearhead in the 424th's sector, but the main force of the attack caught the left flank of the 3rd Battalion (in the northern part of the 424th's sector), the Cannon Company at Eigelscheid and the right (south) flank of the 106th Recon Troop at Grosskampenfeld. On the first day of the attack, the 3d battalion and the 2d battalion counterattacked to regain original lines, while the 1st Battalion was used from its original position as division reserve in preventing a major breakthrough at Winterspelt.

 The initial regimental mission was to hold in place, and to aid this mission CCB of the 9th Armored Division arrived on 17 December to clear Winterspelt and then attack southeast from that town, to relieve the pressure on the north flank of the regiment. Then later in the day of the 17th, Division decided to withdraw back of the OUR River before the 9th Armored could fairly get started from its clearing mission.

 When the _ _ _ _ regimental _ _ _ _ the Our River, from its original position at Heckhalenfeld back to Burg-Reuland at 210017 December, the primary regimental mission became one of holding open the Burg Reuland Road as a possible route for an armored counterattack. After the next withdrawal to the vicinity of Commanster, the regimental mission became one on establishing a perimeter defense, with the 3d battalion charged with the primary mission of protecting against possible counterattack from the northeast.

 Withdrawing through Vielsalm, the 424th fought as Armored Infantry with the 7th Armored Division. The evacuation was aided as many of the troops rode out on tanks half tracks.

 The decision to attach the 2d battalion, 424th Infantry, to CCA, 7th Armored in the vicinity of Manhay was reached because Colonel Reid deemed the 2d to be his strongest battalion at the time, and he received orders to attach one of his battalions as Armored Infantry infantry on 25 December. The general plan of the 7th Armored was to have the CCB execute a wide sweep southeast into the Manhay area, while CCA was then to move in and mop up. Colonel Reid stated that the “wide sweep” did not pan out as successfully as expected, it fell far short of the cavalry charge anticipated because of the heavy antitank gun opposition along the axis of the advance. Therefore, when CCA attacked with the 2d battalion, 424th, the slugging was very slow and the 2d Bn, 424, was cut up very badly just north of Manhay.